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1. Iqwurgxfwlrq
The study of electoral systems has developed into a rich and diverse field of
research with important contributions coming from several disciplines including
political science, philosophy, mathematics, and economics. Such studies, inter alia,
address issues of classification, investigate the direct and indirect effects of different
electoral systems, and evaluate existing and ideal type electoral systems against
a large number of normatively or analytically relevant criteria. All these research
questions are conditional on the understanding of the actual working of electoral
systems. Consequently, the literature is rich in work highlighting how different
systems translate votes into seats. While comparative studies typically calculate
the effects of variation in the electoral systems’ individual components (v. [3],
[4], [6], [7], [8], [9]), country studies mostly demonstrate how these components
interact to produce the electoral outcomes (v. [1], [5] and the country chapters
in [2]). Common to most such endeavour is detailed description of institutional
detail. Clearly, this is essential for understanding individual cases, illustrating the
empirical range of various manifestations of the individual components of electoral
systems, and reaching out to political practitioners. In this paper we take a different
perspective at describing how electoral systems work that puts the emphasis on
parsimony.
We approach algorithmically the electoral system of the organs determining the
(central) Government (executive power). The bases of the electoral systems are
contemplated, without regard to details (e.g., the representation of Trentino-Alto
Adige in the Italian Senate or the subtleties of the three-tier apportionment of
seats in Austria). In a general (pre-mathematical) sense, algorithms are precise
procedures designed to solve a problem, be it locating a book in library or, as in
our case, allocating a given number of parliamentary seats among the contenders.
An algorithm has to satisfy several criteria including universality (it must work
in all specific applications), definiteness (its steps must be clearly defined in their
sequence and content), and finiteness (it must terminate after a finite number of
steps and deliver a result).
By reducing electoral systems to an algorithmic scheme, it becomes clear how
every particular system is determined by the choice of very few parameters. In
this sense, our analysis is in the wake of the seminal contribution of [8], where the
stylized facts of reality are profiled, and the famous three ”electoral law variables”
(ballot structure, electoral district size and electoral formula) are considered.
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2. Ghqhudo iudphzrun
We consider a constituency with n seats. There is a set S of eligible candidates;
we suppose that the number of candidates, |S|, is greater than or equal to the
magnitude of the constituency: |S| ≥ n.
Each ballot contains an ordered list of at most m candidates. Let S(m) be the
set of (ordered) lists formed by at most m different elements of S; according to the
relevant electoral system, perhaps not all these lists are admissible to be chosen by
the voters. Let T ⊆ S(m) be the set of admissible lists that may be written on a
ballot. For example, in a closed list system, only the lists proposed by the parties
that have met the requirements for candidacy are in T .
The larger is T , the more information is provided by the voter. The maximum
information is provided if m = |S| and T = S(m); for this to be practicable,
the magnitude of the constituency should be small. The minimum information
corresponds to closed lists.
After the election, the set P of valid ballots is obtained. After counting, the final
outcome of the election in the constituency is the set E of elected candidates.
We summarize the basic notation:
• n: number of seats of the constituency
• S: set of eligible candidates (we assume |S| ≥ n)
• T ⊆ S(m), set of admissible contents of ballots
(where S(m) is the set of (ordered) lists formed by at most m different elements
of S)
• P : set of valid ballots.
• E: set of elected candidates.
The counting process is iterative; at the end of each iteration one candidate
is either elected or disqualified. At the beginning E contains no candidate (i.e.
E = ∅). During the implementation of the algorithm, E increases (as the candidates
are elected) and S decreases (as the candidates are elected or disqualified). Thus
if candidate k is elected, then it is added to E and eliminated from S:
E ← E ∪ {k}, S ← S ∼ {k}
If candidate h is disqualified, it is eliminated from S:
S ← S ∼ {h}
In each iteration only the first candidate in the ballot (after all the candidates
already elected or disqualified are disregarded) is considered for election. Given an
eligible candidate i ∈ S, we denote by Pi ⊆ P the set of those ballots in which i
is the top candidate among those still in S (i.e. among those not yet elected or
disqualified).
Every ballot j ∈ P has a weight ρj . This weight is initially 1, and then the
weight decreases as candidates listed in the ballot are elected.
In each iteration we begin by counting the votes xi of every candidate i ∈ S, i.e.
the weighted number of ballots in which i is the top candidate (among those not




ρj , for every i ∈ S
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3. Aojrulwkpv zlwkrxw glvtxdolilfdwlrq
In the simplest case, no disqualification of candidates is considered. In each
iteration simply the candidate k with the highest weighted number of ballots is
elected:
k← argmax {xi, i ∈ S}
Recall that when candidate k is elected the weights of all the ballots in j ∈ Pk
decrease; let us call ck the reduction factor, i.e.:
ρj ← ckρj , for every j ∈ Pk
A scheme of a family of algorithms follows; when the three parameters n, T and
ck are fixed, a concrete algorithm is determined. Every time an algorithm is run, it
is applied to a particular instance of the problem; the instance is determined by the
two data S and P . The outcome of the algorithm is the set of elected candidates
E.
PRELIMINARY SCHEME OF ALGORITHMS
STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS: n, T
COUNTING PARAMETER: ck









ρj for every i ∈ S
STEP 3 (election)
k ← argmax {xi, i ∈ S};
E ← E ∪ {k}; S ← S ∼ {k};
ρj ← ckρj for every j ∈ Pk;
if |E| < n then go to step 2 else END
In particular, the scheme above covers all the traditional list electoral systems,
where voters may only vote for closed lists proposed by political parties. Two
possibilities deserve special consideration:
• Factor ck depends only on the position of candidate k in the original party
list. The systems based on the highest average method (see, e.g., [4]) are
obtained just setting the parameter ck with the adequate values. For example,
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• Factor ck depends only on the (weighted) number of ballots xk. The systems
based on the largest remainder method result as particular cases setting the
parameter ck adequately. Each one of these systems is based on a quota q
defined from the total number |P | of valid ballots cast; so q = |P | /(n + 1) is





Note that the first possibility (positional ck) requires party list voting, whereas
the second possibility does not have this restriction.
In real world party list systems, often an admissibility threshold is imposed:
only the ballots containing lists with a number of votes greater than this threshold
are considered (e.g., 3% in Spain1 (Congreso de los Diputados), 4% in Austria
(Nationalrat) or 5% in Germany (Bundestag)). On the other hand, it is sometimes
possible for the voters to intervene in the setting of the order of candidates in the
party list through an additional voting process; this is the case in Germany, where
only after considering the so-called ”first vote” the order of the candidates in the
lists of parties is established2.
In the Italian case the algorithm has to be applied (at least) twice. The parties
are grouped into coalitions (a party not belonging to an explicit coalition forms a
coalition in itself). Both for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate the voter
chooses a closed party list. Let’s consider the apportionment of 617 of the 630
seats of the Chamber of Deputies (12 seats for the Italian residents abroad and
1 seat for the Valle d’Aosta follow special rules). Firstly the algorithm is applied
to the coalitions (Hare quota, with admissibility thresholds of 10% for multi-party
coalitions and 4% for ”single-party coalitions”). If, as a result, the winning coalition
has obtained at least 340 seats (55% of 617), the first phase is finished; otherwise,
340 seats are allotted to the winning coalition and the remaining 277 seats are
divided among the remaining coalitions as before. Once the seats are assigned to
the coalitions, the algorithm is applied again to divide the seats of every multi-
party coalition among the constituting parties (Hare quota, with an admissibility
threshold of 2% for each party). The system is similar for the Senate, but now the
constituency is no longer the whole nation, but every region.
4. Aojrulwkpv zlwk glvtxdolilfdwlrq
Now we introduce the possibility of disqualification of candidates. At the end of
each iteration one candidate is either elected or disqualified. Let k be the candidate
with the highest weighted number of ballots, xk. If xk is greater than the eligibility
(lower) threshold l, then k is elected. Otherwise the candidate h with the lowest
number of ballots is disqualified:
h← argmin {xi, i ∈ S}
1Considering the magnitude of the constituencies, this threshold has very limited significance
in the Spanish system (and it can be effective only in the constituencies of Madrid and Barcelona).
2The first vote is applied to single-seat constituencies (first-past-the post). Those so elected for
each party are now to be considered at the top of the corresponding party list (taking into account
that the candidates for the single-seat constituencies may also be candidates of their parties in
the party lists). Those elected with the first vote remain so even if they are not elected with the
algorithm; the size of the Bundestag is increased accordingly (”Überhangmandate”).
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Apart from this simple idea, the resulting scheme of algorithms is like that of
the last section. When the four parameters n, T , ck and l are fixed, a concrete
algorithm is determined.
MAIN SCHEME OF ALGORITHMS
STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS: n, T
COUNTING PARAMETERS: l, ck









ρj for every i ∈ S
STEP 3 (election)
k ← argmax {xi, i ∈ S};
if xk > l
then E ← E ∪ {k}; S ← S ∼ {k};
ρj ← ckρj for every j ∈ Pk;
if |E| < nthen go to step 2 else END
else go to step 4
STEP 4 (disqualification)
h← argmin {xi, i ∈ S};
S ← S ∼ {h};
go to step 2
Note that the Preliminary Scheme of Algorithms is a particular case with l =
−∞. The Main Scheme of Algorithms covers also the traditional preferential elec-
toral systems.
We consider, e.g., the Irish system in some detail. Here the voter provides the
maximum of information: m = |S| and T = S(m) (certainly the voters may refrain
from listing all the candidates). The magnitude n of the constituencies is 3, 4
or 5. Now l = |P | /(n + 1), the Droop quota. In every iteration the election
of a candidate is attempted; if no candidate can be elected in this iteration, one
candidate is disqualified. If k is elected, the weight of the ballots in the set Pk
(formed by the ballots in which k is the top candidate among those still in S) is
decreased by the factor ck =
xk−l
xk
. Alternatively, without using weights, a random
sample (of the corresponding size) of ballots of Pk is taken, and the rest of the
ballots of Pk is discarded. Either simple sampling or stratified sampling (with
proportionate allocation) can be applied; in the latter case the strata are given by
the candidate (in S) following k in the ballots. In the long run, weighting (called
”Gregory method”) and sampling are equivalent; in practice stratified sampling is
used in Ireland.
Consider the following table, with n = 3 (the data are taken from [4]). In
the first iteration, no candidate can be elected and O’Riordan is disqualified (l =
8352). Now his name plays no further part in all ballots, and thus the 3,796
ballots where he is in the top position are ”transferred” according to the second
preferences shown on them (in 287 ballots only the name of O’Riordan comes up;
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these are ”non-transferable ballots”). In the second iteration, Crowley is elected.
Now cCROWLEY = 1668518 , and the algorithm applies the weight
166
8518 to all ballots
where Crowley is the first preference; alternatively, as in the table, 166 of these
ballots are selected with stratified sampling (the apportionment for the 4 strata is
given by the distribution of the 8,518 Crowley’s ballots: 5,644 for Creed, 564 for
Moynihan, 1,232 for Roche , and 1,078 not transferable), and the remaining 8,352
are put aside of the counting. Creed is elected in the third iteration, and Moynihan
in the fourth one.
1st PREF. TRANSF. TRANSF.
Creed 7,037 +1,292 8,349 +110 8,469
Crowley 7,431 +1,087 8,518 -166
Moynihan 7,777 +566 8,343 +11 8,354
O’Riordan 3,796 -3,796
Roche 7,343 +564 7,907 +24 7,931
NON-TRANSF. +287 287 +21 308
TOTAL 33,404
In fact, when a candidate is elected a variant of the procedure above is used in
Ireland. Stratified sampling is not implemented in Pk, but in a subset V ⊆ Pk.
Thus when Crowley is elected, V is formed by those ballots transferred to Crowley
after the disqualification of O’Riordan, excluding those having no preference after
the names of O’Riordan and Crowley (non-transferable). The distribution of these
1,087 ballots is: 783 for Creed, 72 for Moynihan, 145 for Roche , and 87 not
transferable. The proportions of Creed, Moynihan and Roche of the 1,087-87=1,000
ballots provide now the apportionment for the 3 strata, as shown in the table below.
1st PREF. TRANSF. TRANSF.
Creed 7,037 +1,292 8,349 +130 8,479
Crowley 7,431 +1,087 8,518 -166 8,352
Moynihan 7,777 +566 8,343 +12 8,355
O’Riordan 3,796 -3,796
Roche 7,343 +564 7,907 +24 7,931
NON-TRANSF. +287 287 +0 287
TOTAL 33,404
When in the algorithm election and disqualification are carried out, there are
usually non-transferable ballots. For simplicity, we have supposed that there are
always enough transferable ballots for all seats to be allocated with the algorithm.
In a two-rounds electoral process, the algorithm has to be applied obviously
twice. This is the case in France (Assemblée Nationale). The reader will find it
trivial to carry out the relevant adjustments.
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